Tocqueville continues to examine the effects of electing a head of State, or President, in this case, turning particular attention to the election process. He says: “It then only remained for them to choose the least dangerous of the various modes of election… (p. 148)”. I find it interesting that he qualifies the options by implying that they are all dangerous. For he could have stated, simply, that it only remained for them to choose the “best” of the various modes of election. This tends to be how we approach electoral reform today. We want to choose a better system, typically a proportional system that translates more directly into seats. Would we be more careful in changing our electoral system if we thought we were changing from one dangerous mode of election to another dangerous mode?

 

As we discussed on Day 6, we tend to see fences as obstacles to our ideal system, and wish to remove them all. What Tocqueville reminds us is that there will always be fences, as there will always be dangers in an electoral system. The question is not “should we have fences,” but “which fences should we have, how high should they be and where shall we place them”. Let’s see what fences Tocqueville recommends.

 

I’ve never understand why America uses its system of electing its Presidents by “electoral college.” According to Tocqueville, it was to help ensure that there was a clear majority for one of the candidates. It sounds like back in the early days, there were many viable candidates (rather than just Democrat and Republican) and the fear was that the candidate with the most votes might only have say, 28% of the popular vote, instead of 54% or whatnot that the Democrat or Republican would get today given that there are only two choices. So, in order to increase the likelihood of majority, each state had a vote and all of the seats for that State went to the winner. This way, even if the leading candidate only had 28% of the popular vote, they might win 58% of the electoral college votes, making them the clear winner, especially in the eyes of the people and the other parties and their partisans.  

 

Our first past the post system in Canada has a similar effect. Even though a party may only win 40% of the popular vote, or less, it can end up with 70% of the seats, making them a clear winner and giving the government a strong mandate. Proportional representation is often promoted on the basis that it will more accurately reflect the popular vote. But if that was a problem we specifically designed a fence in our system to avoid, are we really sure we can take it down without danger? Given that proportional representation is more likely to result in minority governments with less clear mandates, what does this mean for peace, order and good government in Canada?

 

There are even more dangers to watch out for in electing heads of State. When a head of State has to be re-elected to remain in power, they have the resources of the State at their disposal, which are very tempting to use for partisan advantage. Tocqueville writes: “All laws and all the negotiations he undertakes are to him nothing more than electioneering schemes; places become the reward of services rendered, not to the nation, but to its chief; and the influence of the government, if not injurious to the country, is at least no longer beneficial to the community for which it was created.” Who in Canada cannot read this and think of numerous examples of this abuse, from using the advertising budget of government to fund ads beneficial to the governing party, to changing campaign spending rules in the favour of the ruling party, to timing a large new baby bonus to the pre-election period. The list goes on.

 

This is mostly corruption and the only real means we have of stopping it is electing another government when we get the chance. But there is nothing stopping the new government from doing the same. Consequently, the only real means to avoiding the problem is to try to erect some fences to limit the freedom politicians have of doing this. Again, good fences make good government. Oddly, to me at least, Tocqueville considers the idea of not allowing the head of State to be re-elected. They would only serve one term. Whoa!
There is, yet, more. There is a risk that an elected head of State will be too populist… “He adopts its likings and its animosities, he hastens to anticipate its wishes, he forestalls its complaints, he yields to its idlest cravings, and instead of guiding it, as the legislature intended that he should do, he is ever ready to follow its bidding (p.155)”. This is tied in somewhat with the previous harm. For it is by pandering to the desires of the populace, for such things as increased baby bonuses, that he increases his chances of re-election. This is not good government, but it is good politics. In essence, we are creating a sort of maze that our politicians have to run through in order to get elected. If we use our fences wisely, we can block off their access to the tools and paths that lead to politicking, rather than governing.